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Abstract
Most students benefit from loans and are able to repay them when they leave higher education. However,
borrowing, combined with other risk factors for not completing higher education (such as working too many
hours, lack of adequate preparation, and part-time attendance), puts many students, especially low-income
and first-generation students, at a particular disadvantage. The authors raise important policy questions about
whether the system of financing higher education is appropriate. We believe that these questions and the
recommendations from the authors deserve serious attention. There are, of course, many legitimate points of
view about how to best support students financially. However, requiring students to assume significant
financial risks so early in their educational careers poses a barrier to educational opportunity for many low-
income and first-generation students.
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Foreword
Borrowers Who Drop Out is an important contribution to the National 
Center’s and the nation’s understanding of students who aspire to earn 
educational certificates and degrees, but do not achieve their goals—and yet 
are saddled with significant debt to repay. It is the first report we know of that 
compares students who borrow and then drop out of postsecondary education 
with those who borrow and complete their degrees. 
 The authors are Lawrence Gladieux, an independent education policy 
consultant, and Laura Perna, assistant professor of higher education at 
the University of Maryland, College Park. These researchers utilized the 
most recent and comprehensive data available from the U.S. Department 
of Education on students who first enrolled in postsecondary education 
in 1995–96, with a snapshot of the same students in 2001. The findings are 
revealing, if not disturbing. Half of the students who enrolled in postsecondary 
education borrowed in 1995–96; more than 20% of those students dropped out 
of their educational programs, yet were burdened with significant debt. They 
had, in effect, the worst of both worlds—they did not benefit from the higher 
income associated with education beyond high school, and they accumulated 
significant educational debt. Many of these students were unemployed in 2001 
and defaulted on their loans, thus damaging their credit standing for the future. 
 Most students benefit from loans and are able to repay them when they 
leave higher education. However, borrowing, combined with other risk 
factors for not completing higher education (such as working too many 
hours, lack of adequate preparation, and part-time attendance), puts many 
students, especially low-income and first-generation students, at a particular 
disadvantage. The authors raise important policy questions about whether 
the system of financing higher education is appropriate. We believe that these 
questions and the recommendations from the authors deserve serious attention. 
There are, of course, many legitimate points of view about how to best support 
students financially. However, requiring students to assume significant 
financial risks so early in their educational careers poses a barrier to educational 
opportunity for many low-income and first-generation students.
 The National Center would like to thank The Lumina Foundation for 
Education for its support of this project, as well as the advisory committee 
members who reviewed drafts of this report: Jacqueline King, John Lee, Michael 
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McPherson, Derek Price, Richard Wagner, and Thomas Wolanin. In addition, 
the National Center thanks Jerry Davis, retired program officer of the Lumina 
Foundation, for his support and review of this report. The contents of this 
publication do not necessarily represent the views of Lumina Foundation for 
Education, its offi cers or staff.
 Joni E. Finney 
Vice President 
The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 
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Introduction
Every investment involves an element of risk, and borrowing to pay for college 
expenses is no exception. Borrowing remains a sound investment for most 
students, but many who borrow and then drop out appear to have lost the bet. 
Students who borrow money for college begin postsecondary education with 
more academic and financial risk than other groups. Some of these students, 
after borrowing and then dropping out of college, beat the odds and go on to 
productive careers. Perhaps their courses and experience help them succeed, 
even without a certificate or degree. Or perhaps they come from families 
sufficiently well off that the accumulated debt is not burdensome. 
Yet, along with those who do not finish high school and those who stop with 
a high school diploma, many college dropouts fall into what has been called 
“the forgotten half” of our nation’s young adult population.1 The findings in 
this report, in providing a snapshot of students’ experiences, suggest that many 
borrowers who drop out of postsecondary education may be left behind in the 
nation’s economy. 
The growing reliance on loans to finance rising college tuition has drawn 
widespread attention in the media and public policy debates. Much of the 
publicity and concern focuses on students who pursue a four-year degree and 
take on significant debt, averaging from $15,000 to $20,000 in debt by the time 
they graduate. Some college graduates have borrowed much larger amounts, 
and average debt burdens are especially high for low-income and minority 
students who complete their programs of study.2 However, most students who 
achieve their degrees reap sufficient economic benefits to pay off their loans. 
For the first time, this study examines those who may be least well-served by 
our current system of financing higher education: students who invest in their 
own education by borrowing, but who do not complete their postsecondary 
programs. A recent report by the Education Trust warned that “hundreds of 
thousands of young people leave our higher education system unsuccessfully, 
burdened with large student loans that must be repaid, but without the benefit 
of the wages a college degree provides.”3 This report examines the dimensions of 
this problem and identifies ways to address it. 
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Both individuals and society reap significant economic and other benefits 
from investing in higher education, and loans have become a pervasive means 
of financing student costs and consequently realizing these benefits. However, 
there are serious negative consequences of the loan trend. For example, half of 
entering freshmen borrow, and one-fifth of borrowers drop out.4 In 2001, this 
meant that there were more than 350,000 ex-students who had begun college six 
years earlier, but had no certificate or degree, and a debt to repay. For students 
who began at four-year institutions and expected to attain a bachelor’s degree, 
borrowers who dropped out were twice as likely to be unemployed as borrowers 
who received a degree, and more than ten times as likely to default on their loan. 
These findings provide an alert to policymakers and educational leaders, 
who can hardly be satisfied when so many students leave school with no 
credential, a debt to repay, and a high risk of defaulting on that debt—or with 
no debt, no degree, and therefore little gain in earning power to offset the time 
and money invested in postsecondary education. This report suggests the 
need for policy and educational leaders to establish policies and programs to 
better prepare, support, and guide students, especially low-income students, 
in completing their degrees. In addition, public policymakers and educational 
leaders must do all they can to assist students in making appropriate decisions 
about the use of loans to finance the costs of their postsecondary education. 
This report draws from the most recent and comprehensive data available: 
family background, demographic, and other characteristics for the group of 
students who first enrolled in postsecondary education in 1995–96, along with a 
snapshot of data about what happened to them by 2001 (for example, enrollment 
status, academic experience, cost of attendance, financial aid, loan obligations, 
and employment status). The study provides a profile of students who borrow 
and then drop out, and compares them with other groups, including those who 
borrow and do receive a certificate or degree. The principal source of data is the 
longitudinal Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) study, which the National 
Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education inaugurated 
in 1989 and repeated in the 1990s. (For extensive information about data sources, 
limitations, and definitions, see Appendix I.) 
Since minimal changes have occurred in federal student loan programs since 
2001, it is likely that the findings in this report are relevant to recent groups of 
students. In fact, since loan rates and debt burdens have been rising, the choices 
and tradeoffs highlighted in this report may be more extreme now than they 
were for students who first enrolled a decade ago—and the need for action 
therefore even more vital today.
2
Borrowers Who Drop Out
Section I
Key Findings and Consequences of the Current 
Financing System
The following findings and policy implications are drawn from the more 
detailed analyses in Section II of this report, and the recommendations in 
Section III. 
HOW MANY STUDENTS BORROW? 
Half of all entering freshmen borrow. Considering the entire population of 
students who started postsecondary education in 1995–96 (more than three 
million), half had borrowed to help pay for their undergraduate studies within 
the next six years (see figure 1). 
Freshmen who start at four-year colleges and expect to attain a bachelor’s 
degree are even more likely to borrow. Of all students who first enrolled in a 
four-year institution in 1995–96 and who reported that they aspired to earn at 
least a bachelor’s degree, two-thirds (67%) had borrowed by 2001 (see figure 1). 
Those who start at two-year colleges are less likely to borrow. Of those 
students who first enrolled in a public two-year college in 1995–96, a third 
(33%) had borrowed by 2001 (see figure 1). 
A high percentage of students who start 
at private, for-profit, less-than-four-year 
institutions borrow. Of those students 
who first enrolled for short-term skills 
training in a private for-profit institution 
of less than four years in duration, about 
two-thirds (68%) had borrowed by 2001 
(see figure 1). 
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Figure 1 
Half of All Entering Freshmen Borrow
67%
50%
68%
67%
50%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Freshmen at private, for-profit,
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to attain at least a bachelor's degree
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Percentage of first-time freshmen who 
borrowed within 6 years of enrolling
Borrowers Nonborrowers
Note: Percentages are for first-time freshmen who first enrolled in 1995-96, and their status in 2001.
Source: Calculated from Appendix II, tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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HOW MANY STUDENT BORROWERS DROP OUT?
More than 20% of all borrowers drop out. Considering all students who 
started postsecondary education in 1995–96, more than one-fifth (23%) of those 
who borrowed did not complete their programs and were not enrolled in 2001 
(see figure 2). That is, more than 350,000 beginning freshmen were left with no 
certificate or degree, and a debt to repay. Of all borrowers who first enrolled 
in a four-year institution in 1995–96 and who reported that they aspired to at 
least a bachelor’s degree, 19% had 
dropped out six years later.5 Of 
those borrowers who first enrolled 
in a public two-year college in 
1995–96, 24% had dropped out. Of 
those borrowers who first enrolled 
for short-term skills training in a 
private for-profit institution of less 
than four years in duration, almost 
a third (32%) dropped out. These 
percentages suggest that no matter 
what kind of institution students 
enroll in, a large number of those 
who borrow drop out. 
DOES BORROWING INFLUENCE COMPLETION RATES? 
The reality of higher education is that many need to borrow to complete 
a bachelor’s degree. For first-time freshmen at public two-year institutions, 
a much higher percentage of 
nonborrowers (55%), compared 
with borrowers (24%), drop out 
(see figure 3). Also, a much higher 
percentage of borrowers (21%), 
compared with nonborrowers 
(6%), complete a bachelor’s 
degree. The low completion rates 
for bachelor’s degrees (21% for 
borrowers, 6% for nonborrowers) 
cannot be solely traced to large 
numbers of students who may be 
enrolling in a two-year institution 
without plans to continue to a 
Figure 2
About One-Fifth of All Borrowers Drop Out
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Note: Percentages are for first-time freshmen who first enrolled in 1995-96, and their status in 2001.
Source: Appendix II, tables 1, 2, 3, 4.
Figure 3 
Borrowing and Completion for Freshmen at Two-Year Colleges
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Source: Appendix II, table 3.
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four-year institution: 72% of first-time freshmen starting at public two-year 
institutions expect to get a bachelor’s degree or higher. Within this context, the 
lower dropout rates and the higher rates of bachelor’s degree completion for 
those who borrow may suggest that borrowing promotes degree attainment. 
It is likely, however, that the higher completion rates for those who borrow 
portray the financial reality of higher education today: most of those who begin 
at a two-year institution may need to borrow if they expect to be able to pay the 
costs of completing their bachelor’s degree. 
For freshmen who start at four-year colleges and expect to receive a 
bachelor’s degree, borrowers and nonborrowers have similar completion 
rates. By studying borrowing data for students who first enrolled in a four-year 
institution and who reported that they expected to attain at least a bachelor’s 
degree, it is possible to control for differences associated with type of institution 
attended and educational expectations. Figure 4 reveals that for students 
who enroll in a four-year institution and expect to receive at least a bachelor’s 
degree, bachelor’s degree attainment 
and dropout rates are comparable. 
About 20% of borrowers and of 
nonborrowers dropped out within 
six years of enrolling, and about 60% 
of each group attained a bachelor’s 
degree within this time. This 
suggests that borrowing—with these 
two key factors being equal—does 
not necessarily increase or decrease 
a student’s chances of completion. 
Rather (as the previous paragraph 
revealed), borrowing is a reality for 
many students if they expect to be 
able to stay in college and finish 
their degrees.
Known risk factors for dropping out appear to be more important than 
borrowing in affecting a student’s chances for degree completion. Among 
the known risk factors for dropping out are delaying entry into postsecondary 
education after high school, attending college part-time, and working full-time 
while enrolled. Of those who borrowed and dropped out, one-fourth delayed 
their entry into college after high school, 12% attended college part-time, and 
12% worked full-time (see figure 5). (These percentages are for students who 
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Figure 4
Borrowing and Completion for Freshmen at Four-Year Institutions
 Who Expect to Attain a Bachelor's Degree 
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Source: Appendix II, table 2.
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started at four-year institutions 
and expected to complete at least 
a bachelor’s degree.) For those 
who did not borrow and dropped 
out, the percentages are even 
higher: 36% delayed entry into 
college, 25% were enrolled part-
time, and 21% worked full-time. 
By contrast, virtually all students 
who received their bachelor’s 
degree—whether they borrowed 
or not—went on to college right 
after high school, attended 
full-time, and did not work or 
worked part-time. 
Academic preparation appears 
to be more important than 
borrowing status for bachelor’s 
degree completion. Regardless 
of borrowing status, more than 
half of those who dropped out 
had a grade point average of 
less than 2.25 in the first year 
they were enrolled (see figure 
6). By contrast, about a tenth of 
bachelor’s degree recipients—
whether they borrowed or 
not—had a grade point average 
of less than 2.25 in their first year 
in college. Likewise, about one-
quarter of those who dropped 
out—whether they borrowed or not—took at least one remedial course in their 
first year, while about a tenth of those who completed a bachelor’s degree took 
a remedial course. (These percentages are for students who started at four-
year institutions and expected to complete at least a bachelor’s degree, but the 
patterns also hold for students who started at a public two-year institution.) 
Whether they borrow or not, those who drop out are more likely to come 
from lower-income backgrounds than those who complete their degrees, and 
their parents are more likely to have lower levels of education. In addition, 
6
Figure 6 
Regardless of Borrowing Status, Those Who Drop Out Tend 
to Be Less Prepared for College
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     portrays dropout and completion status in 2001 for freshmen who first enrolled in a four-year institution in 1995-96 
     and expected to attain at least a bachelor's degree.
Source: Appendix II, table 2.
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Note: To control for differences associated with type of institution attended and educational expectations, figure 5
     portrays dropout and completion status in 2001 for freshmen who first  enrolled in a four-year institution in
     1995-1996 and expected to attain at least a bachelor's degree.
Source: Appendix II, table  2.
Figure 5 
Regardless of Borrowing Status, Those Who Drop Out Are
 More Likely to Have Known Risk Factors for Non-Completion 
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compared with those who received bachelor’s degrees, larger percentages of 
both borrowers and nonborrowers who dropped out were 20 years of age or 
older when they enrolled in college, and had children of their own. All of these 
are known risk factors for dropping out. 
WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE WHO BORROW AND DROP OUT? 
Borrowers who drop out and nonborrowers who drop out have equivalent 
employment experiences six years after first enrolling, but borrowers 
who drop out face greater economic hardship due to their debt burden. 
Comparable percentages of borrowers who dropped out and nonborrowers 
who dropped out were unemployed in 2001. For those who were working, 
median annual salaries for borrowers who dropped out and nonborrowers 
who dropped out were identical: $24,000. However, nonborrowers did not 
have a student debt burden, while borrowers who dropped out had incurred 
a median debt of $7,000 in undergraduate loans. Moreover, by 2001, nearly 
one-fourth of borrowers who dropped out (about 90,000) had defaulted on at 
least one loan, most likely resulting in a bad credit rating and other negative 
consequences for the borrower. (These figures are based on all first-time 
freshmen enrolling in 1995–96, and their employment and loan outcomes in 
2001.) 
Borrowers who drop out after first enrolling in a four-year institution 
fall far short of realizing the economic rewards that are associated with 
earning a bachelor’s degree. 
Corroborating much previous 
research on the benefits of a 
bachelor’s degree, this finding 
is based on students who 
first enrolled in a four-year 
institution in 1995–96 and said 
that they expected to attain 
at least a bachelor’s degree. 
Compared with students 
who borrowed and attained 
a bachelor’s degree, those 
who borrowed and dropped 
out were more than twice as 
likely to be unemployed six 
years later (see figure 7). If they 
were employed, they were 
Note: Percentages are for first-time freshmen who first enrolled in a four-year institution in 1995-96 and expected
     to attain at least a bachelor's degree. Employment status and loan status are for 2001.
Source: appendix II, table 2.
Figure 7 
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much more likely to be in low-paying jobs. Those who attained a bachelor’s 
degree borrowed more than those who dropped out, but 22% of borrowers 
who dropped out were in default on at least one loan in 2001, while only 2% of 
borrowers with bachelor’s degrees were in default. 
Borrowers who drop out after first enrolling in a public two-year institution 
likewise do not realize the economic benefits of an associate’s degree. 
Among those who first enrolled in a public two-year institution in 1995–96, 
those who borrowed and dropped out were less likely to be unemployed in 
2001 than those who borrowed 
and received an associate’s 
degree (see figure 8). However, 
among those who were 
employed, median salaries were 
higher for associate’s degree 
recipients than for borrowers 
who had dropped out. Those 
who borrowed and received 
an associate’s degree averaged 
slightly higher amounts of debt 
and monthly loan repayments 
than those who borrowed 
and dropped out, but the 
economic hardship imposed 
by borrowing was greater for 
those who dropped out than 
for associate’s degree holders. 
Borrowers who dropped out 
were four times as likely as associate’s degree recipients to be in default on 
their loans. 
Economic outcomes are strikingly parallel for borrowers who drop out and 
students who earn a certificate for short-term training. Considering only 
students who first enrolled in a private for-profit institution of less than four 
years’ duration, students who received a certificate—as a group—appear to 
be no better off six years after first enrolling than borrowers who dropped 
out (see figure 9). Borrowers who received a certificate were about as likely 
as borrowers who dropped out to be unemployed in 2001. Neither median 
earnings (for those who were employed) nor median loan amounts were 
significantly different for borrowers who dropped out versus borrowers who 
Borrowers who dropped out Borrowers who completed associate's
Figure 8
 Employment Status and Loan Status for Borrowers 
at Two-Year Colleges  
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completed a certificate. Default rates on loans were high for both groups, 
though somewhat higher for those who dropped out: a quarter of borrowers 
who received a certificate and a third of borrowers who dropped out had 
defaulted on a loan by 2001. 
THE DOUBLE-BIND FOR LOW-INCOME STUDENTS
Borrow too much, or work 
too much? Many students—
particularly low-income 
students—are faced with a 
double-bind: Borrowing can 
cause long-term negative 
financial consequences for 
those who fail to complete their 
programs. Yet avoidance of 
borrowing may push students 
to delay enrolling after high 
school, to enroll part-time in 
college, or to work full-time 
while in college, each of which is 
a known risk factor for dropping 
out of college. For all 1995–96 
entering freshmen, borrowers 
who dropped out were less 
likely than nonborrowers who 
dropped out to: delay enrollment, 
enroll part-time, or work full-
time (see figure 10). In short, it 
appears that borrowing can be a 
pitfall, but so can enrolling part-
time or working too much while 
in college, which may jeopardize 
getting a degree. 
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Borrowers who dropped out Borrowers who completed certificate
Figure 9 
Employment Status and Loan Status for Borrowers at 
Private For-Profit Institutions of Less than Four Years 
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Source: Appendix II, table 4.
Figure 10 
Are Students Who Avoid Borrowing More Likely to 
Engage in Risk Factors for Dropping Out? 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT FINANCING SYSTEM 
The findings in this report suggest that there are some significant, negative, and 
lasting consequences of the current system of financing higher education in the 
United States, particularly for students from lower-income and lower-middle-
income families. While much of the policy and media attention concerning 
student debt over the past decade has focused on the increasing debt burden 
for students at high-priced colleges and universities, the potentially more 
detrimental effect concerns the debt burden of those students who borrow and 
do not complete their degrees, since it is the students without degrees who are 
more likely to face economic hardships in the future. 
Given the substantial public and private benefits that result from investing 
in higher education, the principal message of this report is the importance of 
providing all motivated students with a realistic chance of entering college 
and persisting to degree completion. This study provides no basis for limiting 
or discouraging loans to students who may enter postsecondary education 
with risk factors for dropping out. On the contrary, it appears that providing 
financial support for these students may improve their opportunities to stay in 
school and complete their degrees. 
Based on the findings of this study, policymakers and educational leaders 
can improve the opportunities for students by focusing on the following 
priorities: 
•  Focus on policies that prepare students better for postsecondary 
training and that help students understand their educational options, 
including the appropriate use of loan financing. The findings in this 
study suggest that those who drop out of college, whether they borrow 
or not, tend to be less academically prepared than those who receive 
a degree. Those who drop out also may be less knowledgeable about 
college (including the implications of borrowing), as suggested by their 
parents’ lower levels of education. 
•  Make college more affordable so as to reduce dependence on loan 
financing and student employment, especially for those with the 
greatest need. Regardless of the type of institution in which students first 
enroll or whether they borrow, those who drop out are more likely to be 
from low-income backgrounds than those who complete a degree. 
•  Strengthen on-campus support for financially and academically at-risk 
students, to ensure that all students who enter postsecondary education 
have the resources to help them succeed in attaining a degree. Not 
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surprisingly, borrowers who drop out tend to have lower salaries six 
years after first enrolling than those who complete an associate’s or a 
bachelor’s degree. Borrowers who drop out also tend to have much 
higher default rates on their loans than borrowers who attain a degree. 
Students who avoid borrowing by enrolling in a less than four-year 
institution, by attending part-time, or by working full-time may also 
realize lower economic attainment, as prior research suggests that 
students following these patterns are less likely to complete a degree. 
The new demography of the college-age population gives special urgency 
to meeting these challenges. This study focuses on the group of students 
who entered postsecondary education in 1995–96, many of whom came from 
disadvantaged family backgrounds and took a nontraditional path to college. 
The oncoming generation of graduating high school seniors promises to be 
much larger than the previous group, and to be still more nontraditional 
and economically disadvantaged. As a society, we need a wide and deep 
commitment to preparing low-income students for education and training 
beyond high school, and assuring that price is not a barrier to their success 
in college. Based on the findings of this study and other pertinent research 
identified in this report, our increasingly loan-dependent system of financing 
higher education does not appear to be well suited to this task. 
As a next step in improving opportunities for success in college, Section 
III of this report provides specific recommendations for schools, colleges and 
universities, the states, the federal government, and communities and the 
private sector in striving toward the three priorities identified above. As with 
other lasting educational challenges, reducing students’ dependence on loans 
and increasing their opportunities for success will require substantial efforts 
across the educational and policy spectrum. 
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Section II
Analysis of the Data on Dropouts
This section provides detailed analyses of the data shown in the four tables that 
comprise Appendix II of this report. The data in all tables represent students 
who first enrolled in postsecondary education in 1995–96 and their status and 
other outcomes as of 2001. 
The first subsection below, based on the data in table 1, compares the 
characteristics and outcomes of borrowers and nonborrowers who dropped 
out. Table 1 presents data for the entire cohort of students for the years 
identified above. The second subsection, which relies on the data in table 2, 
compares borrowers and nonborrowers who dropped out with borrowers 
and nonborrowers who attained a bachelor’s degree; the data in table 2 are 
restricted to students who first enrolled in a four-year institution. The third 
subsection of the analysis compares borrowers and nonborrowers who dropped 
out with borrowers and nonborrowers who attained an associate’s degree; it 
is based on table 3, which includes only students who first enrolled in a public 
two-year institution. The final subsection compares borrowers who dropped 
out with borrowers who attained a certificate for short-term skills training; it is 
based on table 4, which includes only students who first enrolled in a private, 
for-profit, less-than-four-year institution.
DROPOUTS AND BORROWING (Appendix II, Table 1)
Most of the analyses in this subsection compare borrowers who dropped out 
with nonborrowers who dropped out. 
Borrowers who dropped out (see Appendix II, table 1, column 2) are similar 
to nonborrowers who dropped out (see Appendix II, table 1, column 7) in terms 
of several background characteristics and academic experiences. About half of 
both borrowers who dropped out and nonborrowers who dropped out have 
parents with no more than a high school education. About half of students 
in both groups come from families with lower incomes (that is, with incomes 
below 200% of the poverty level).6
The similarity of pre-college incomes of borrowers who dropped out 
and nonborrowers who dropped out may appear to be an anomaly. One 
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might expect that borrowers would have lower incomes. This finding may 
be explained by differences between the two groups in terms of the type 
of institution attended and other 
enrollment characteristics. For example, 
many low-income students may choose 
to avoid borrowing by attending 
low-cost community colleges. About 
75% of nonborrowers who dropped 
out enrolled first in a public two-year 
college, compared with only 32% 
of borrowers who dropped out (see 
figure 11). Substantially larger shares 
of borrowers who dropped out—
compared with nonborrowers who 
dropped out—first attended a public 
four-year college, a private four-year 
college, or a private for-profit institution.
Compared with nonborrowers 
who dropped out, borrowers who 
dropped out were more likely to engage 
in other behaviors that are generally 
associated with degree completion (see 
figure 12). Whereas 79% of borrowers 
who dropped out were enrolled full-
time, only 51% of nonborrowers who 
dropped out were enrolled full-time. 
Borrowers who dropped out were 
also less likely to work full-time while 
enrolled, compared with nonborrowers 
who dropped out (23% versus 40%). 
As a result of enrollment and financing patterns, the costs of attendance 
are substantially lower for nonborrowers who dropped out than for borrowers 
who dropped out. Sixty percent of nonborrowers who dropped out had 
an attendance-adjusted student budget below $5,000, whereas only 21% of 
borrowers who dropped out had a budget below this level.7 
Despite differences in enrollment and financing patterns, borrowers who 
dropped out and nonborrowers who dropped out had similar employment 
experiences six years after first enrolling. Similar percentages of both groups 
Figure 11
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were unemployed, and similar percentages of both groups held a job that was 
closely related to their coursework. Median annual salaries for those who were 
working were identical: $24,000. 
But borrowers who dropped out faced greater economic hardship from 
their participation in postsecondary education than did nonborrowers who 
dropped out. While both groups had similar labor market experiences in 2001, 
borrowers who dropped out had additional costs. By 2001, borrowers who 
dropped out had incurred a median debt from undergraduate loans of $7,000. 
In addition, 25% of borrowers who dropped out had defaulted on at least one 
loan. 
For students who drop out, the economic hardship imposed by borrowing 
appears to vary by race/ethnicity. Blacks represented a larger share of 
borrowers who dropped out than of nonborrowers who dropped out (21% 
versus 14%). Likewise, Asians represented 5% of borrowers who dropped out, 
but only 2% of nonborrowers who dropped out. In contrast, whites represented 
a smaller share of borrowers who dropped out than of nonborrowers who 
dropped out; 61% of borrowers who dropped out were white, while 70% of 
nonborrowers who dropped out were white. 
Considering the costs of borrowing against the generally comparable 
benefits of some college attendance for both borrowers and nonborrowers, it 
appears that six years after first enrolling in college, borrowers who drop out, as 
a group, may be worse off financially than nonborrowers who drop out. On the 
other hand, the above data suggest that many students may avoid borrowing 
by enrolling at low-cost, public two-year institutions, by attending part-time 
rather than full-time, and by working full-time while enrolled. While borrowing 
may have negative financial consequences for students who fail to complete 
their programs, avoidance of borrowing (including working too much) may 
jeopardize students’ chances of getting a degree. 
DROPOUTS AND BACHELOR’S DEGREE RECIPIENTS (Appendix II, Table 2)
Previous research using the Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) survey 
data has identified factors associated with low persistence, particularly in 
relation to the goal of bachelor’s degree attainment.8 To control for differences 
in two of these factors—type of institution attended and educational 
expectations—this subsection is limited to students who first enrolled in a four-
year institution in 1995–96 and who reported in 1995–96 that they expected to 
attain at least a bachelor’s degree. 
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Of all students who first enrolled in a four-year institution in 1995–96 and 
who reported that they aspired to at least a bachelor’s degree, two-thirds (67%) 
had borrowed by 2001. For both borrowers and nonborrowers, dropout rates 
and bachelor’s degree attainment rates were comparable. By 2001, about 20% 
of borrowers and of nonborrowers had dropped out and about 60% of both 
groups had attained a bachelor’s degree (see figure 4, page 5). 
Students who began postsecondary programs in 1995–96 but had not 
received a degree and were not enrolled in 2001 (see Appendix II, table 2, 
columns 2 and 7) generally came from less economically advantaged family 
backgrounds and took a less traditional path to college than students who 
attained at least a bachelor’s degree by 2001 (see Appendix II, table 2, columns 
6 and 11). Borrowers who dropped out came from somewhat less privileged 
family backgrounds than nonborrowers who dropped out (see Appendix II, 
table 2, columns 2 and 7). 
Students who dropped out were more likely than those who completed a 
bachelor’s degree to have parents with low educational attainment levels (see 
figure 13). Those who borrowed were also somewhat more likely than those 
who did not borrow to have 
parents with lower educational 
attainment levels. Likewise, 
students who dropped out were 
more likely than students who 
completed a degree to be below 
the poverty level: Among both 
borrowers and nonborrowers who 
dropped out, about 1 in 5 came 
from families below the poverty 
level, compared with about 1 in 
10 for borrowers who attained 
a bachelor’s degree, and 1 in 20 
for nonborrowers who attained a 
bachelor’s degree (see figure 13).
Students who dropped out—whether or not they borrowed—were more 
likely to be independent of their parents when they started their postsecondary 
programs, compared with those who completed a bachelor’s degree. Likewise, 
students who dropped out were also more likely to have already had children 
of their own when they enrolled, compared with those who completed a 
bachelor’s degree. 
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It appears that borrowing may promote behaviors associated with degree 
completion, and avoidance of borrowing may promote behaviors associated 
with dropping out. Among the known risk factors for dropping out are 
delaying entry into postsecondary education after high school, attending 
college part-time, and working too much while enrolled. One-fourth of those 
who borrowed and later dropped out delayed their entry into college after high 
school, 12% attended college part-time, and 12% worked full-time (see figure 5, 
page 6). For those who did not borrow and later dropped out, the percentages 
are even higher: 36% delayed entry into college, 25% enrolled part-time, and 
21% worked full-time. By contrast, virtually all students who received their 
bachelor’s degree—whether they borrowed or not—went on to college right 
after high school, attended full-time, and did not work or worked part-time. 
The attendance-adjusted cost of attendance was higher for borrowers who 
dropped out than for nonborrowers who dropped out. Twenty-two percent of 
borrowers who dropped out had budgets of $15,000 or more, while only 8% of 
nonborrowers who dropped out had budgets at this level or higher. 
Regardless of whether or not they borrow, students who drop out appear 
to be less academically prepared for college, and they average lower academic 
performance in college than those who complete a bachelor’s degree. Nearly 
all students who dropped out, as well as nearly all who completed a bachelor’s 
degree, had received a regular high school diploma prior to enrolling in college. 
However, higher shares of those who drop out than of those who attain a 
bachelor’s degree took at least 
one remedial course during their 
first year of college enrollment 
(see figure 14). Likewise, 
regardless of borrowing status, 
more than half of those who 
dropped out had a grade point 
average of less than 2.25 in the 
first year they were enrolled. 
By contrast, only about a tenth 
of bachelor’s degree recipients 
had a grade point average of less 
than 2.25 in their first year of 
college. 
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Not surprisingly, those students who completed a bachelor’s degree fared 
better in the labor market than those who dropped out, as measured six years 
after initial enrollment. In 2001, 15% of borrowers who dropped out and 11% 
of nonborrowers who dropped out were unemployed, compared with about 
7% of those who completed a bachelor’s degree. Those dropouts who were 
employed had median incomes of $24,000 to $25,000, while bachelor’s degree 
recipients who were employed had median incomes of $30,500 to $32,000.
Likewise, borrowers who dropped out averaged lower amounts of debt 
and lower monthly repayments than borrowers who completed a bachelor’s 
degree. Borrowers who dropped out had accumulated a median debt of 
$10,000, while borrowers who completed a bachelor’s degree had accumulated 
$17,000 in debt. Median monthly repayments for those who were repaying their 
debts were $125 for borrowers who dropped out and $200 for borrowers who 
completed a bachelor’s degree. Among borrowers with earnings, the median 
debt-to-earnings ratio was lower for those who dropped out than for those who 
attained a bachelor’s degree: 5.3% versus 7.3%. 
Even with lower debt and repayment burdens, however, borrowers 
who dropped out had substantially higher default rates on their loans than 
borrowers who completed a bachelor’s degree. In 2001, 22% of borrowers who 
dropped out, compared with only 2% of borrowers who completed a bachelor’s 
degree, were in default on at least one loan. 
Those who dropped out—whether they borrowed or not—were less likely 
than those who completed a degree to realize the economic benefits associated 
with attaining a bachelor’s degree. However, borrowers who dropped out, as 
compared with nonborrowers who dropped out, experienced greater economic 
hardship from their participation in postsecondary education. Median earnings 
and employment rates were comparable for borrowers who dropped out 
and nonborrowers who dropped out. But borrowers who dropped out were 
faced with repaying a median debt of $10,000. In addition, blacks may be 
disproportionately affected by these patterns, as they represented a higher share 
of borrowers who dropped out (18%) than of nonborrowers who dropped out 
(12%), borrowers who completed a bachelor’s degree (11%), or nonborrowers 
who completed a bachelor’s degree (3%). 
Borrowers Who Drop Out
DROPOUTS AND ASSOCIATE’S DEGREE RECIPIENTS (Appendix II, Table 3) 
To control for the relationship between the type of institution attended and the 
likelihood of receiving an associate’s degree, the analysis in this subsection is 
limited to students who first enrolled in a public two-year institution in 1995–96. 
In contrast to the extensive pattern of borrowing at four-year institutions, 
only one-third of students who first enrolled in a public two-year institution in 
1995–96 had borrowed by 2001. However, it may be that borrowing promotes 
degree attainment, as a higher share of borrowers than of nonborrowers who 
first enrolled in a public two-year institution attained an associate’s degree (24% 
versus 13%) or a bachelor’s degree (21% versus 6%) by 2001 (see figure 3, page 
4). Also, a much smaller share of borrowers than of nonborrowers dropped out 
by 2001 (24% versus 55%). It is likely, however, that the higher completion rates 
for those who borrow portray the financial reality of higher education today: 
most of those who begin at a two-year institution need to borrow if they expect 
to be able to pay the costs of staying in college and completing a degree. 
Students who attained an associate’s but not a bachelor’s degree within 
six years (see Appendix II, table 3, columns 5 and 10) came from backgrounds 
fairly similar to those who dropped out and received no degree (see Appendix 
II, table 3, columns 2 and 7). Their parents’ educational attainment was likely to 
be low, as well as their family income level. These students were more likely to 
be financially independent of their parents than were students who attained an 
associate’s degree, and they were 
more likely to have children of 
their own. Many delayed entry 
into postsecondary programs 
after high school, worked full-
time, or attended college part-
time. 
Behaviors that are known to 
promote degree attainment are 
less common among borrowers 
who dropped out than 
borrowers who completed an 
associate’s degree, but are more 
common among borrowers who 
dropped out than nonborrowers 
who dropped out (see figure 15). 
18
Figure 15
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That is, as with borrowing among students at four-year institutions, borrowing 
among students at two-year institutions may promote behaviors that lead to 
degree completion, while avoidance of borrowing may promote behaviors 
associated with dropping out. 
Among those who first enrolled in a public two-year institution, about 
three-fourths of borrowers who dropped out, and about three-fourths of 
borrowers who received an associate’s degree, said they expected to attain at 
least a bachelor’s degree when they first enrolled. In their first year, borrowers 
who dropped out and borrowers who completed an associate’s degree took 
remedial courses at nearly the same rate (33% versus 29%). 
As with students at four-
year institutions, however, 
inadequate academic 
achievement appears 
to be a barrier to degree 
completion for students at 
public two-year colleges. 
Grade point averages for 
first-year students were 
higher for those who went 
on to complete an associate’s 
degree within six years 
than for those who dropped 
out—regardless of borrowing 
status (see figure 16). 
In terms of employment and other economic benefits of attending college, 
it appears that borrowers who drop out after first enrolling in a public two-
year college do not realize the economic benefits associated with an associate’s 
degree (see figure 8, page 8). In 2001, smaller shares of borrowers who dropped 
out (12%) and nonborrowers who dropped out (15%) were unemployed, 
in comparison with the share of associate’s degree recipients who were 
unemployed (21%). However, for those who were employed, median salaries 
appear to be higher for borrowers who attained an associate’s degree ($31,200)9 
than for those who dropped out ($22,000). Median salaries appear to be 
comparable for borrowers who dropped out ($22,000) and nonborrowers who 
dropped out ($24,000). 
Students who borrowed and attained an associate’s degree had higher 
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median debt levels than those who borrowed and dropped out ($9,000 versus 
$6,000); they also had higher monthly repayment obligations ($120 versus 
$110). Among borrowers with earnings, the median debt-to-earnings ratio 
was identical for those with an associate’s degree and those who dropped 
out (4.8%). Nonetheless, default rates on loans were substantially higher for 
borrowers who dropped out than for borrowers with an associate’s degree (25% 
versus 6%). 
Borrowers who dropped out not only faced greater risk of defaulting 
on their loans than borrowers who attained an associate’s degree, but also 
experienced greater economic hardship than nonborrowers who dropped out. 
Unemployment rates and median salaries were comparable for borrowers 
and nonborrowers who dropped out, but borrowers who dropped out faced a 
greater cost: a median debt of $6,000. As with students at four-year institutions, 
blacks may be disproportionately affected by these patterns, as they represented 
a higher share of borrowers who dropped out (21%) than of nonborrowers who 
dropped out (14%), borrowers who completed an associate’s degree (9%), and 
nonborrowers who completed an associate’s degree (2%). 
DROPOUTS AND CERTIFICATE RECIPIENTS (Appendix II, Table 4) 
This subsection compares the profiles of students who borrow and drop out 
(see Appendix II, table 4, column 2) with the profiles of students who borrow 
and attain a certificate for 
short-term skills training (see 
Appendix II, table 4, column 
4). This analysis is limited to 
individuals who first enrolled 
in a private, for-profit, less-
than-four-year postsecondary 
education institution in 1995–
96. 
Of these students, more 
than two-thirds (68%) had 
borrowed by 2001 (see figure 
1, page 3). Although similar 
proportions of borrowers 
(54%) and nonborrowers 
(52%) attained a certificate 
by 2001, a somewhat smaller 
Figure 17
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share of borrowers (32%) than nonborrowers (40%) dropped out (see figure 17).
Among borrowers who first entered a private, for-profit, less-than-four-
year institution in 1995–96, those who dropped out and those who earned 
a certificate within six years shared similarly disadvantaged background 
characteristics (see figure 18). (In fact, these characteristics generally described 
all students who first enrolled in this type of institution.) Nearly half of 
borrowers who dropped out, nonborrowers who dropped out, and borrowers 
who completed certificates came from families below the poverty level. Well 
over a majority of borrowers who dropped out, nonborrowers who dropped 
out, and borrowers who 
completed certificates had parents 
with no more than a high school 
education. Large percentages 
of borrowers who dropped out, 
nonborrowers who dropped out, 
and borrowers who completed 
certificates were single parents, 
age 30 or older, and financially 
independent. The vast majority 
of borrowers who dropped out, 
nonborrowers who dropped out, 
and borrowers who completed 
certificates delayed entry into 
postsecondary education 
after high school. Substantial 
proportions of borrowers who 
dropped out, nonborrowers who 
dropped out, and borrowers 
who completed certificates did 
not have a regular high school 
diploma when they enrolled.  
Labor market outcomes are generally better for borrowers who attain an 
associate’s degree or a bachelor’s degree, as compared with their counterparts 
who drop out. However, this does not appear to hold true for students who 
receive certificates, when considering the economic prospects of students 
six years after they first enrolled (see figure 9, page 9). Borrowers who 
earned a certificate were about as likely as borrowers who dropped out to 
be unemployed in 2001 (about 20% were unemployed). For those who were 
Figure 18
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employed, median salaries were roughly comparable for borrowers who 
dropped out and borrowers who completed certificates ($25,000 versus 
$23,400). 
The absence of an advantage in the labor market for borrowers who 
completed certificates, as compared with borrowers who dropped out, may be 
attributable to other differences between borrowers who completed certificates 
and borrowers who dropped out. For example, borrowers who completed 
certificates, as compared with borrowers who dropped out, were more likely to 
be female (71% versus 59%) and Hispanic (26% versus 13%). 
Borrowers who completed certificates accumulated similar amounts of 
debt as borrowers who dropped out (median debt of $6,500 versus $5,000). 
Likewise, median debt-to-earning ratios were not significantly different for 
borrowers who completed certificates and borrowers who dropped out (5.5% 
versus 4.7%). High percentages of both groups defaulted on their loans: 24% of 
borrowers who completed certificates defaulted on at least one loan, and 34% of 
borrowers who dropped out did so. 
The generally parallel outcomes between borrower dropouts and certificate 
recipients are based on broad indicators in the Beginning Postsecondary 
Students (BPS) survey data. Examination of differences among specific types of 
certificate training (or over longer periods of time) is limited due to the absence 
of appropriate data. An exploratory analysis using the best available measures 
in the Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) study suggests that loan default 
rates vary by program of study. Among borrowers who first enrolled in a 
private, for-profit, less-than-four-year institution and who received a certificate, 
loan default rates ranged from about 10% in technology and mechanical fields, 
to 18% in cosmetology, 21% in nursing and allied health fields, and 30% in 
business and secretarial fields. 
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Section III
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
BENEFITS OF A BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
These analyses highlight a neglected aspect of loan financing in higher 
education: students who borrow and do not complete their programs. 
The findings also put in bold relief a compelling factor that has been well 
documented: attaining a bachelor’s degree has significant economic benefits. 
Students who fall short of a bachelor’s degree average significantly lower 
rewards in terms of employment, annual salaries, and default rates than those 
who persist and reach this educational goal. 
This is not to say that the bachelor’s degree is the only ticket to success 
for individuals or for the national economy. “Going to college” means many 
things and produces many outcomes. Our society needs a range of sub-
baccalaureate opportunities, providing skills and credentials for surviving in a 
changing world, and our culture needs to confer more status and value on non-
baccalaureate education.10
Yet the findings in this report show that, at least as measured six years after 
first enrolling, those who have a bachelor’s degree have considerably more 
leverage in today’s job market than those who do not. This finding is consistent 
with other data showing the persistent earnings gap over a lifetime between 
bachelor’s degree recipients and individuals with a high school diploma or 
less.11 Bureau of Labor Statistics data show, too, that our future economy will 
require a workforce with increasingly high levels of skills and training. Millions 
of new jobs are projected to require a four-year degree or more in the coming 
decade.12 
UNCERTAIN BENEFITS OF SHORT-TERM, FOR-PROFIT TRAINING 
A more cautionary word is in order regarding the economic value of short-term 
certificate training provided by for-profit schools. Our analyses reveal that a 
large number of students who enrolled in private, for-profit, less-than-four-year 
institutions defaulted on their loans—whether they dropped out or earned 
their certificate. The economic returns and associated default rates appear to 
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vary by types of certificate training, but students who consider enrolling in and 
borrowing to pay for such programs should be aware of the possible risks and 
of the best available estimates of career earning potential. Likewise, state and 
federal governments have a responsibility to help insure the quality and utility 
of such training, and thereby to protect consumer interests. 
THE ONCOMING TIDAL WAVE OF STUDENTS 
On grounds of both equity and economics, America must fulfill its promise 
of opportunity through higher education. This means giving all motivated 
students an equal shot at realizing their potential. It means narrowing the wide 
socioeconomic gaps between those who do and those who do not successfully 
attend and graduate from our nation’s colleges and universities. In particular, it 
means improving the chances of success for low-income, first-generation, and 
nontraditional students, since they face a wider array of obstacles than other 
students, and therefore need additional assistance. 
The new demography of college-age students gives special urgency to 
meeting this challenge. The baby boom that followed World War II produced 
an explosion of college enrollments in the 1960s and 1970s. Now, the children 
of the baby boomers are arriving at college age; this group of high school 
graduates will yield a somewhat smaller but still dramatic expansion in the 
college-age population over the next 15 years. By one estimate there will be 
2.6 million more undergraduates on campus in 2015 than there are today—a 
product of the baby boom echo, rising immigration, and more adult learners.13
This study has focused on the cohort of students who entered 
postsecondary education in 1995–96, many of whom came from disadvantaged 
family backgrounds and took a nontraditional path to college. The oncoming 
generation of students promises to be still more nontraditional and 
economically disadvantaged. According to projections from the U.S. Census, 
this generation will be more ethnically diverse than ever, and the fastest growth 
will come from groups in our society that have traditionally been poorer than 
the general population, and more educationally at-risk.14
As a society, we will need a much wider and deeper commitment to 
reaching, motivating, and preparing low-income students for college—and 
assuring that price is not a barrier for their persistence and success in college. 
Based on the findings of this study and other pertinent research, our nation’s 
increasingly loan-dependent system of financing higher education may not be 
well suited to this task. 
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As we have seen in this study, low-income students rely more heavily on 
loans than do other students. Some low-income students appear to use loans 
to make choices that are generally associated with higher rates of bachelor’s 
degree attainment, including: initially enrolling in a four-year institution, 
attending full-time, and working no more than part-time. Other low-income 
students make choices that are known to reduce the probability of degree 
completion, including: enrolling in a less-than-four-year institution, enrolling 
part-time, and working full-time. When students are also inadequately 
prepared for the academics of college, the likelihood of dropping out of college 
increases. As a result of being inadequately prepared, significant numbers 
of both groups—that is, borrowers and nonborrowers—wind up with no 
credential. All students who fail to complete their degree programs incur the 
costs that are associated with attending their programs, including the costs of 
attendance and lost earnings. But in addition to these costs, those who borrow 
have a student debt to repay and a risk of default. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings in this report suggest that there are some significant, negative, 
and lasting consequences of the current system of financing higher education 
in the United States, particularly for students from lower-income and lower-
middle-income families. Given the substantial public and private benefits 
that result from investing in higher education, the principal message of this 
report is the importance of providing all motivated students with a realistic 
chance of entering college and persisting to degree completion. This study 
provides no basis for limiting or discouraging loans to students who may enter 
postsecondary education with risk factors for dropping out. On the contrary, it 
appears that providing financial support for these students may improve their 
opportunities to stay in school and complete their degrees. 
The most promising approach in remedying the problems encountered by 
borrowers who drop out is to adopt policies and programs to help all students 
who are at risk for dropping out. The findings of this research suggest that 
policymakers and educational leaders should focus their efforts on three 
important priorities: 
• Focus on policies that prepare students better for postsecondary 
training, and that help students understand their educational options, 
including the appropriate use of loan financing. The findings in this 
study suggest that those who drop out of college, whether they borrow 
or not, tend to be less academically prepared than those who receive 
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a degree. Those who drop out also may be less knowledgeable about 
college (including the implications of borrowing), as suggested by their 
parents’ lower levels of education. 
• Make college more affordable so as to reduce dependence on loan 
financing and student employment, especially for those with the 
greatest need. Regardless of the type of institution in which students first 
enroll or whether they borrow, those who drop out are more likely to be 
from low-income backgrounds than those who complete a degree. 
• Strengthen on-campus support for financially and academically at-risk 
students, to ensure that all students who enter postsecondary education 
have the resources to help them succeed in attaining a degree. Not 
surprisingly, borrowers who drop out tend to have lower salaries six years 
after first enrolling than those who complete an associate’s or a bachelor’s 
degree. Borrowers who drop out also tend to have much higher default 
rates on their loans than borrowers who attain a degree. Students who 
avoid borrowing by enrolling in a less-than-four-year institution, by 
attending part-time, or by working full-time may also realize lower 
economic attainment, as prior research suggests that students following 
these patterns are less likely to complete a degree. 
Schools, colleges and universities, the states, the federal government, and 
communities and the private sector can advance the above objectives through 
the following commitments: 
What High Schools Can Do
• Prepare students to succeed in college. To address the problems 
identified in this report concerning borrowers who drop out (and college 
graduation rates in general), a large part of the responsibility rests with 
the nation’s schools: to strengthen academic preparation and reduce the 
wide gaps in achievement across socioeconomic groups. In turn, this 
challenge presents a question of political will. In this rich nation of ours, 
can we find the means and the will to set high standards for all students—
and help students meet them?
• Inform, motivate, and counsel students about their postsecondary 
options. College-bound students need to understand the risks and 
benefits of investing in their college education and, if necessary, financing 
the costs through loans and work. 
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What Colleges, Universities, and For-Profit Institutions Can Do 
• Contain costs and prices. In Measuring Up 2004, the National Center for 
Public Policy and Higher Education concluded that higher education 
was less affordable for students and their families in 2004 than in 1994, at 
least in part because increases in the costs of attending college exceeded 
increases in family income.15 
• Award the bulk of institutional grant and scholarship aid on the basis 
of need. Institutional aid should be directed to academically qualified 
but financially needy students, not those who can afford to pay without 
assistance. While some low-income students forego higher education 
because of inadequate financial resources, others attempt to pay the 
costs of their education by borrowing or making choices that reduce the 
probability of completing the degree (for example, enrolling in a less-
than-four-year institution, attending part-time, or working full-time). 
• Invest more heavily in early guidance and partnerships with K–12 
schools. It is in the enlightened self-interest of postsecondary institutions 
to expand the pool of potential applicants who are academically qualified 
for and knowledgeable about college. Reaching out to ensure that at-risk 
students are academically and financially prepared for college is a long-
term investment that will pay off for higher education and for the nation.
• Help students from all backgrounds adjust to campus life and persist 
in their studies. Institutions need to allocate resources to help at-risk 
students, and to intervene early when students may be having academic, 
financial, and other problems. Where needed, schools should provide 
intensive basic course work, especially in the freshman year, and establish 
transfer policies that help students retain academic credit. For less-
endowed schools, funds from state, federal, and private sources may 
be especially important for creating safety nets and support services on 
campus.16
• Help students understand the risks and benefits of their financing 
options. Some students arrive on campus without the necessary financial 
literacy or maturity to make sound choices about borrowing, credit 
cards, work, housing, and academic course loads and selections. Colleges 
should make a greater effort to link academic and financial advising, 
thereby helping students to choose financing strategies that support their 
academic goals.17 
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What States Can Do 
• Emphasize need-based grant aid over no-need merit scholarships and 
tax-advantaged tuition financing. State merit scholarships do not, by and 
large, expand access or help those with the greatest need. Neither do state 
tuition-tax incentives. State governments should examine the purposes 
of state financial aid programs to ensure that financially needy students 
have the resources that are necessary not only to enroll, but also to persist 
in their degree programs.
• Increase need-based grant aid in step with tuition increases. Too often, 
tuition and fees end up as a filler or balancer in the state budget process, 
and too often, student financial aid is an afterthought. Policymakers need 
to look at these interrelated decisions and establish linkages among them 
in relation to state policy goals.
• Expand efforts to help at-risk students in middle and secondary 
schools prepare for postsecondary education. For example, in the wake 
of California’s Proposition 209, which eliminated affirmative action 
programs in that state, California increased its investment in early 
guidance and outreach in an effort to pursue the same broad goals of 
access and campus diversity. State K–16 partnerships may also improve 
academic preparation for college. All states need to make deeper and 
wider commitments to ensure the successful transition of students from 
K–12 schools to postsecondary education.
• Increase support for Education Opportunity Programs (EOP) and other 
state programs that provide resources to institutions to help students 
stay on track to their certificate or degree. This support is especially 
important for institutions that do not already have built-in, multiple 
support services for students who may be at risk. 
What the Federal Government Can Do
• Restore the value of Pell Grants and other need-based grant assistance. 
This is the most direct action the federal government can take to improve 
the affordability of college for low- and moderate-income students and 
reduce their dependence on loans and work. 
• Help students manage their debt. As the principal sponsor of student 
loans, the federal government should build coalitions of schools, 
colleges, lenders, loan guarantors, and state agencies to curb unnecessary 
borrowing and ease repayment burdens, especially for borrowers facing 
economic hardship. Students need help in evaluating how much they 
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should borrow based on their career interests, likely career outcomes, and 
potential ability to repay. Borrowers who are beginning the repayment 
phase should be counseled on forbearance and deferment opportunities 
and flexible repayment options, including income-based as well as 
extended and graduated repayment plans. 
• Make borrowing less expensive by lowering or eliminating origination 
fees. Students who borrow under federal programs do not benefit from 
the entire amount borrowed, since, as authorized by federal law, the costs 
of administering federal loans are paid in part by student fees. 
• Help to link financial aid with early guidance and mentoring. The 
most successful early college awareness and intervention programs in 
the private sector combine a promise to pay tuition with academic and 
motivational support to keep students in school and on track for college. 
Recent experience with the federal GEAR-UP Program suggests that 
making this linkage on a large scale in a government program is not an 
easy task. But federal policymakers should persist in supporting such 
efforts. 
• Increase funding for on-campus Student Support Services. As with 
similar programs at the state level, this federal program provides 
resources to colleges to help low-income and nontraditional students 
persist in their studies.18 
What Communities and the Private Sector Can Do 
• Consider directing more scholarship assistance toward students with 
the greatest financial need. Most private scholarships are awarded based 
on merit with no consideration of financial need. Scholarship sponsors 
should consider targeting aid on academically promising, low- and 
moderate-income students—those who might not otherwise be able to 
afford higher education, rather than on students who would likely be 
able to finance the costs of college even without the scholarship aid.
• Go beyond scholarships alone. Private and community-based efforts 
should be comprehensive in fostering student access and success. 
Financial aid should be combined with support for counseling and 
outreach to help prepare students not only to enroll, but also to persist to 
degree completion. 
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Appendix I
Data Sources and Definitions 
Borrowers who drop out have been overlooked, perhaps in part because data 
have not been available to document the extent of the problem—until recently. 
The principal source of data for our research is the longitudinal Beginning 
Postsecondary Students (BPS) study, which the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. Department of Education inaugurated in 1989 
and repeated in the 1990s. The BPS:90/94 tracks degree attainment, enrollment 
status, and financing patterns among a sample of students who were first-
time freshmen in 1989–90 with follow-ups in 1992 and 1994 (five years after 
the students matriculated). Tracking a sample of students who first enrolled 
in some type of postsecondary education between May 1, 1995, and April 30, 
1996, with follow-ups in 1998 and 2001 (six years after first enrolling), the BPS:
96/01 provides more recent and more useful information. With the application 
of the appropriate NCES-derived longitudinal weight, the BPS:96/01 sample 
is representative of the population of first-year students who first enrolled in 
postsecondary institutions in the United States and Puerto Rico in 1995–96.19 
One improvement in the BPS:96/01 over the BPS:90/94 is the incorporation 
of data from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), which the 
federal government has developed over the past decade. The NSLDS provides 
data on each loan transaction for each member of the BPS sample who received 
a loan. Although not perfect, NSLDS provides the best and most comprehensive 
information available on borrowing, loan status, and repayment. While NSLDS 
provides information on each loan transaction, we use data from the most recent 
transaction to determine repayment status. 
A strength of the BPS data sets is the inclusion of data from multiple sources, 
including the NSLDS as well as institutional records and student interviews. A 
related weakness, however, is that sometimes the data on borrowing conflict. 
When student-reported data conflict with NSLDS data, we used NSLDS as the 
source. When various student-reported data pertaining to loans conflict, we rely 
on the BPS-derived composite of whether a student reported ever receiving a 
loan.
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Students start out at many different places in postsecondary education 
(in terms of their institution first attended, aspirations, backgrounds, and so 
on), and likewise leave postsecondary education with a diversity of outcomes. 
No database can pinpoint all the variables in this fluid process of educational 
opportunity. Using the BPS, our analysis presents the best available proxy 
indicators, at specific points in time.
Two further limitations of the data used in this study should be noted. One 
is that the BPS includes only students who attended a postsecondary institution. 
A useful policy question might be whether people who borrowed and dropped 
out are better off than those who did not go to postsecondary education at all. 
Unfortunately the data do not allow us to address that question directly.
Second, the data set we use has only minimal data on the pre-college 
academic qualifications of students in the sample. Some of our results suggest 
that dropping out may be correlated with pre-college qualifications, and the 
level of pre-college qualifications is likely correlated with other variables, such 
as socioeconomic status and the quality of high schools students attended. 
Lacking controls on school quality, however, we are unable to disentangle these 
effects. This is also an unavoidable limitation of the data set.
DEFINITIONS 
Students Who Drop Out
In the BPS:96/01 data set, we assume that students who drop out are those 
who, at the time of the second follow-up (six years after matriculating), had not 
obtained a degree or certificate and were not enrolled (Appendix II, columns 
2 and 7 in all tables). Some individuals in these categories may only be “stop 
outs.” That is, at some point some of these students may re-enroll and complete 
their programs. To that extent, dropouts may be overstated. On the other hand, 
some students who have not achieved a degree and are still enrolled (columns 3 
and 8) may never attain that goal. To that extent, dropouts may be understated. 
Due to lack of later follow-up data, we make the rough assumption that these 
two effects offset each other.20 We refer to students who are not currently 
enrolled and have not attained a credential or degree by 2001 as students who 
have dropped out. 
Default Status on Loans 
Federal student loans are considered in default when a payment has not 
been made after a certain number of days (270 days for loans with monthly 
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payments, and 330 days for loans with less frequent payments). In this study, 
we present default rates based on the number of borrowers who were in default 
on at least one loan in 2001, six years after first enrolling. Using this marker 
understates defaults to the extent that borrowers may have defaulted after 
2001. Whenever they default, borrowers are subject to significant consequences, 
including a damaged credit rating, ineligibility for additional federal student 
aid, payment of collection costs, wage garnishment, and legal action. At the 
same time, our data analysis overstates defaults to the extent that defaulted 
loans in 2001 may have been “rehabilitated” back into repayment status and 
eventually repaid. Under federal rules, rehabilitation requires that the borrower 
makes 12 on-time, full monthly payments, and rehabilitation removes the 
default completely from the borrower’s credit record. The federal loan programs 
include mechanisms that are designed to help borrowers avoid default, 
including deferment of loan repayment for such reasons as unemployment, 
military service, volunteer work, teaching full-time in an area with teacher 
shortages, and disability. Borrowers who die or become totally and permanently 
disabled may have their federal loans cancelled. 
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Appendix II
Source Tables 
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Endnotes
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